Fair dealing and the world of work by Brodie, Douglas
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Brodie, Douglas (2014) Fair dealing and the world of work. Industrial Law 
Journal, 43 (1). pp. 29-51. ISSN 0305-9332 , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/indlaw/dwu001
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/57450/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
1 
 
Fair Dealing and the World of Work1 
Douglas Brodie 
Stirling University 
Introduction  
 
A wide range of contracts provide for the provision of work. The common law of the employment 
contract will be relevant to some; others will be treated as commercial agreements and a different 
corpus of norms will be applicable. Conventional wisdom tells us that there is a strict dichotomy 
between employment and commercial law; they regulate relationships which are different in nature and 
underpinned by different values. The dichotomy seems starker still when one takes into account the 
statutory rights possessed by employees; the rights and duties owed by virtue of an employment 
contract are radically different compared to a contract for services and the relationship which ensues is 
of a fundamentally different character. However, if one simply focusses on the common law of 
contracts for the provision of work it is evident that the dichotomy is something of a false one. It is 
probably not possible to identify terms whose presence is consistent with a contract of employment 
but not one for services.2 The high degree of similitude is reflected in the fact that a fundamental 
element of both contracts is that they involve the exchange of work for payment.3 Again there is a 
great deal of commonality where core default rules are concerned; at least where the economic 
elements of the bargain are in issue rather than the more personal ones. For instance, where the default 
rules in respect of allocation of risk are concerned, both contracts require that performance will be 
discharged with reasonable care which ensures that the risk of poor performance lies with either the 
employee or independent contractor. There have, at least up until recently, been considerable 
differences where the personal dimension is concerned in that the obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence has been held not to apply outwith the employment relationship.4 $JDLQWKHHPSOR\HU·V
                                                          
1 Professor Guy Davidov was kind enough to critically comment upon an earlier draft of this paper and I am 
also indebted to the editor and the anonymous referee for a number of very helpful cooments; the responsibility 
is mine alone. I am also very grateful to Professor Breen Creighton for bringing the decision in Commonwealth 
Bank v Barker [2013] FCAFC 83 to my attention and to Professor David Campbell for allowing me sight of his 
IRUWKFRPLQJDUWLFOH*RRG)DLWKDQGWKH8ELTXLW\RIWKHC5HODWLRQDO¶&RQWUDFW¶76 MLR.    
 
2 Likewise where contracts for semi-dependent workers are concerned: M.Freedland, The Personal Employment 
Contract, (Oxford: OUP 2003) Ch 3.   
3 Collins argues that the difference between the two contracts `does not derive from the terms of the contract, for 
both envisage an exchange of services for payment. H.Collins, `Market Power, Bureaucratic Power and the 
&RQWUDFWRI(PSOR\PHQW¶,/- 
4 Bedfordshire CC v Fitzpatrick Contractors (1999) 62 Construction Law Reports 64.  
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obligations to protect the self-employed worker by taking reasonable care for his health and safety are 
much more circumscribed than is the case where the employee is concerned.  
 
Contracts of employment and those for services have much in common; more in fact than they have 
apart. Inevitably any exercise in comparison of contractual terms will fail to generate clear demarcation 
lines; the true point of departure lies in the fact that hitherto the law of contracts for services has been 
informed by the values of commercial law. Questions of implication and construction may therefore be 
resolved quite differently. The reason that mutual trust and confidence does not apply to a relationship 
of self-employment is because the relationship is entered into at arms-length and implication would 
`conflict with fundamental notions of caveat emptor that are inherent (statute and equitable 
LQWHUYHQWLRQDSDUWLQFRPPRQODZFRQFHSWLRQVRIHFRQRPLFIUHHGRP·5 It is worth recalling that as 
recently as 2002 the Privy Council reaffirmed the `general principle that an express and unrestricted 
SRZHUFDQQRWLQWKHRUGLQDU\ZD\EHFLUFXPVFULEHGE\DQLPSOLHGTXDOLILFDWLRQ·6 At common law it is 
for the parties to judge whether the terms of a commercial exchange are satisfactory and judicial 
intervention is unlikely to be seen as appropriate.  
I would suggest though that traditional thinking seems increasingly outdated as the common law is 
evolving to a position whereby contracts for the provision of work are underpinned by shared rather 
than divergent values. This paper seeks to explore the implications of this evolution with particular 
attention being given to both the employment contract and the contract for services.   
 
Divergence in Values  
Ironically the current trend towards convergence has been preceded by a period of greater divergence 
as, over the last thirty years or so, the employment/commercial dichotomy appeared to have become 
more accentuated as the law of the employment contract evolved to incorporate significant elements of 
good faith. Freedland and Kountouris observing that the `English law of contracts of employment has 
WHQGHGWREHSHUFHLYHGDVPRUHVSHFLDOL]HGDQGGLVWLQFWLYHDVWLPHKDVJRQHRQ·7 In the UK judicial 
recognition of the significance of the peculiarities of the employment contract led to the contract 
evolving in a way that necessitated modification of general contractual principles. Scally v Southern Health 
                                                          
5 Royal Botanic Gardens v South Sydney City Council (2002) 240 CLR 45.  
6 Reda v Flag Ltd Bermuda [2002] IRLR 747. 
7 M. Freedland and N.Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 
185.  
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Board8 and Malik v BCCI9 are landmark decisions on this journey.  Similarly, in a highly influential 
decision in Wallace v United Grain Growers, the Canadian Supreme Court held that employers owed an 
obligation of good faith with respect to the manner of dismissal, the breach of which was to be 
compensated for by adding to the length of the notice period.10 In justifying this position Iacobucci J. 
noted that the contract of employment had a number of characteristics that set it apart from 
commercial contracts. In particular, `the terms of the employment contract rarely result from an 
exercise of free bargaining power in the way that the paradigm commercial exchange between two 
traders does. Individual employees on the whole lack both the bargaining power and the information 
necessary to achieve more favourable contract provisions than those offered by the employer, 
particularly with regard to tenure.·,QDGGLWLRQIacobucci J. stressed that the power imbalance continues 
to affect the conduct of the relationship after the contract has been entered into.  
 
Good faith, and the obligation of mutual trust and confidence in particular, has assumed a central role 
in the life of the employment contract and has acted, and continues to act, as a catalyst for further 
evolution at common law. One illustration of this is the way in  which the implied obligation of fidelity 
has been strengthened and come to demand more by way of propriety where a senior employee is 
concerned: ` Whilst it would be over simplistic to say that the more senior an employee, the greater the 
degree of loyalty and diligence required of him, the scope of the duty imposed on someone at high 
managerial level in a multimillion pound business will involve a heavy burden not to do anything which 
might result in damage to the interests of that business. 11 Popplewell J suggesting that a senior 
manager who became aware of a competitive threat to an aspect of the business for which he is 
responsible would normally come under such a duty, whereas a junior employee without such 
responsibility would not. The fact that good faith has been placed at the core of the employment 
relationship has led to the obligations assumed by senior employees moving closer to those owed by 
fiduciaries. A similar process has taken place in Canada where the courts have gone even further and 
                                                          
8 [1992] 1 AC 294.   
9 [1998] 1 AC 20. 
10 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701. And see Honda Canada v Keays [2008] 294 DLR (4th) 577. 
11 Imam-Sadeque v Bluebay [2013] IRLR 344; Collidge v Freeport [2007] EWHC 1216.  And see M.Freedland 
and N.Kountouris, above n.7.   
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held that some senior employees should indeed be regarded as fiduciaries. The pivotal decision being 
&DQDGLDQ$HUR6HUYLFHY2·0DOOH\ where the Canadian Supreme Court approved the view of Gower that 
fiduciary ` duties, except in so far as they depend on statutory provisions expressly limited to directors, 
are not so restricted but apply equally to any officials of the company who are authorised to act on its 
EHKDOIDQGLQSDUWLFXODUWRWKRVHDFWLQJLQDPDQDJHULDOFDSDFLW\·12 The impact of 2·0DOOH\ has been 
very considerable but also problematic in that definitional issues have abounded: `it has proved very 
difficult to find a convincing basis upon which to distinguish between those who are senior managers 
DQGWKRVHZKRDUHQRW6HFRQG«WKHUDQJHRIHPSOR\HHVZKRKDYHEHHQFDXJKWLVH[WHQVLYH·13 
Canadian experience may make it more likely that the courts in the UK will decide against developing a 
discrete body of default rules for senior managers. Instead the expectations now placed on such 
individuals may be more `likely to influence the way in which the duty of fidelity is interpreted and 
DSSOLHGLQSDUWLFXODUFDVHV·14  
 
The open-textured nature of the obligation of trust and confidence allows it to retain its vitality by a 
constant process of renewal in the light of changes in good practice in employment relations.15 The 
recent Australian decision in Commonwealth Bank v Barker requires that, in a redundancy situation, the 
employer should take steps to consult with the employee about the possibility of redeployment and to 
provide him with the opportunity to apply for suitable alternative positions.16 The decision accords 
with good practice in industrial relations and reflects PXWXDOWUXVW·VRULJLQVLQWKHGXW\RIFR-operation 
by requiring the employer to take positive steps without which the employee is unable to enjoy a right 
                                                          
12 [1973] 40 DLR (3d) 371. 
13 D. Brodie, `The (PSOR\PHQW5HODWLRQVKLSDQG)LGXFLDU\2EOLJDWLRQV¶(/5, 203. 
14 Freedland, above n.1, 190. 
15 Yapp v FCO [2013] ICR D21 demonstrates the extent to which mutual trust and confidence has resulted in 
notions of natural justice being embedded in the employment contract: ` a golden thread through the case law on 
fair treatment is that those liable to be affected by a decision must be given prior notice of it so that they can 
make representations. A corollary is that any representations must be taken into account by the decision-maker. 
7KHJUHDWHUGHWULPHQWDGHFLVLRQLVOLNHO\WRFDXVHWKHPRUHGHPDQGLQJWKHVHGXWLHV¶ 
 
16 Commonwealth Bank above n.1.   
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or benefit conferred upon him by the contract. It is of note that the benefit under the contract was not 
a specific entitlement (as in Scally) but was conceived in terms of the totality of the employment 
relationship. 
 
At first sight, the way in which the law of the employment contract has become increasingly informed 
by notions of good faith would not encourage the development of a hypothesis that a world of shared 
values is in prospect. However, of late, obligations of fair dealing have become more evident in other 
areas of the law of contract. It is my contention that this will result in the content of all contracts for 
the provision of work displaying a greater measure of good faith. A number of factors can be seen as 
responsible for this development but three in particular merit detailed discussion: the implications of a 
relationship being analogous to one of employment; the consequences of a contract being categorised 
as relational; and the validity of conventional assumptions about the role of good faith in the general 
principles of the law of contract.       
 
Analogous Relationships   
In some jurisdictions the courts have now acknowledged that the characteristics highlighted in Wallace 
can also be found in some types of contract which conventionally would be styled commercial; they are 
undoubtedly important characteristics where the employment contract is concerned but cannot be seen 
as unique. A highly significant example is the contract of franchise given that franchisees resemble 
`fuQFWLRQDULHVIRUODUJHFDSLWDOLVWFRUSRUDWLRQV·17 In Shelanu Inc v Print Three Franchising Corp it was 
observed that the contract is one of CDGKHVLRQ«)XUWKHULQVRIDUDVDFFHVVWRLQIRUPDWLRQLV
concerned, the franchisee is dependent on the franchisor for information about the franchise, its 
location and projected cash flow, and is typically required to take a training program devised by the 
franchisor. The third characteristic, namely that the relationship continues to be affected by the power 
imbalance, is also met by the fact the franchisee is required to submit to inspections of its premises and 
audits of its books on demand, to comply with operation bulletins, and, often is dependent on, or 
                                                          
17 A. Felstead, The Corporate Paradox: Power and Control in the Business Franchise (1993) 10. 
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required to buy, equipment or product from the franchisor.·18 Those shared characteristics mean that 
the franchisee is vulnerable in very similar ways to the employee. As with employment there is much 
scope for unfair exercise of prerogative power on the part of the franchisor. The impact of an unfair or 
harsh termination will be felt very strongly in both cases. In Wallace it was said that the `point at which 
the employment relationship ruptures is the time when the employee is most vulnerable and hence, 
most in need of protection. In recognition of this need, the law ought to encourage conduct that 
PLQLPL]HVWKHGDPDJHDQGGLVORFDWLRQERWKHFRQRPLFDQGSHUVRQDOWKDWUHVXOWIURPGLVPLVVDO·19; these 
concerns would seem equally applicable to the franchisee. It should also be said that the franchisee may 
experience additional vulnerabilities compared to the employee; some face a double jeopardy in that 
they are both franchisees and tenants. Again, the fact that the franchisee will often be required to put 
up a significant amount of capital leaves them heavily exposed to the risk of opportunistic behaviour: 
`The incentive that causes a business with sunk costs to stay in operation despite losses makes 
franchisees YXOQHUDEOHWRIUDQFKLVRUEHKDYLRXUNQRZQDV¶RSSRUWXQLVP·%HFDXVHWKHIUDQFKLVHHZLOO
continue to operate even if it is not recovering its sunk investments, the franchisor can make decisions 
that induce such losses without the franchisee going out of business. When these decisions benefit the 
franchisor at the expense of the franchisee, the franchisor opportunistically extracts a portion of the 
IUDQFKLVHH·VVXQNFRVWV$IUDQFKLVRUFDQSRWHQWLDOO\H[WUDFWWKLVYDOXHIURPWKHIUDQFKLVHGLUHFWO\LQD
number of ways: it can raise the price of goods sold to franchisees, increase rent, boost royalties 
through an increase in the required volume of a franchise, levy fees or divert advertising funds to 
general corporate uses. Extractions can occur indirectly as well. To increase the price of new franchises, 
a franchisor could require franchisees to make excessive advertising investments, to participate in 
SURPRWLRQDOSURJUDPVZKLFKDUHQRWFRVWHIIHFWLYHRUWRXQGHUWDNHXQQHFHVVDU\UHQRYDWLRQV·20   
The recognition of the existence and significance of shared characteristics has meant that in a number 
of jurisdictions good faith is adopting a more prominent role in a wider range of contracts. The journey 
in the UK that was prompted by the emergence of mutual trust and confidence is being replicated. 
Where a franchise is concerned the obligations imposed on the franchisor resemble those imposed on 
an employer by virtue of the latter obligation. In Far Horizons Pty v McDonald's Australia  the court 
proceeded on the basis that franchise agreements contain an implied term `of good faith and fair 
dealing which obliges each party to exercise the powers conferred upon it by the agreement in good 
                                                          
18 Shelanu Inc v Print Three Franchising Corp 226 DLR (4TH) 577. 
 
19 Wallace, above n. 10, 95. 
20 Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology May 1997: 
C)LQGLQJD%DODQFH7RZDUGV)DLU7UDGLQJLQ$XVWUDOLD¶, 3.24.  
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faith and reasonably, and not capriciously or for some extraneous purpose. Such a term is a legal 
LQFLGHQWRIVXFKDFRQWUDFW·21 The range and outcome of issues dealt with in franchise disputes bears 
close parallels with the mutual trust and confidence case law. Discriminatory treatment of franchisees 
may give rise to breach of duty;22 the exercise of powers of unilateral variation is moderated by 
requirements of fair dealing.23 However, unconstrained by the challenges of achieving coherence 
between common law and statutory regimes, the courts have held that the capacity to terminate may be 
restricted. In Garry Rogers Motors v Subaru it was argued that the termination was in breach of contract 
because the implied obligation of good faith had been infringed.24 It was held that ` There is no reason 
to think, prima facie at least, that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing would not act as a 
restriction on a power to terminate DFRQWUDFWHVSHFLDOO\LIWKDWSRZHULVLQJHQHUDOWHUPV· 25 However, 
on the facts, the obligation had not been breached. Unaffected by Johnson v Unisys, the oddity of the 
position in the law of the employment contract whereby the point in the relationship where the weaker 
party is most vulnerable (i.e. termination) is not restricted by requirements of fair dealing is not 
replicated. 26 
 
The benefits of the protection afforded can be very considerable. The fact that the franchisor had used 
his powers for an improper purpose was found to be a breach of the implied term of fair dealing in 
$QWRQ\·V3LHUY+%& . 27 There it was held that withholding consent under an express clause (which 
provided for the approval by the land RZQHURIWKHGHYHORSHU·VSODQVwith a view to forcing financial 
concessions involved a breach of contract. A word of caution should be sounded; as in assessing the 
impact of mutual trust and confidence it is salutary to bear in mind that in some cases the outcome 
would have been the same had the decision been decided on a basis other than that of fair dealing. A 
                                                          
21 [2000] VSC 310; Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack's Pty [2001] NSWCA 187.  
22 -3DWHUVRQC,PSOLHG)HWWHUVRQWKH([HUFLVHRI'LVFUHWLRQDU\&RQWUDFWXDO3RZHUV¶0RQDVK8/5
45, 58 citing Kellcove v Australian Motor Industries (unreported, FCA, 6.7.1990) and Laurelmont v Stockdale & 
Leggo [2001] QCA 212.      
23 J F Keir v Priority Management Systems [2007] NSWSC 789.  
24 [1999] FCA 903. 
25 Ibid at para 35. Similarly, in Mangrove Mountain Quarries v Barlow [2007] NSWSC 492 it was said that 
`Acting in good faith means that a party to a contract should not pretend to rely upon breaches of no importance 
WRKLPRUKHUWRDFKLHYHDFROODWHUDOEXWGHVLUHGUHVXOWRIEULQJLQJWKHFRQWUDFWXDOUHODWLRQVKLSWRDQHQG¶Again, 
in Meridian Retail Pty v Australian Unity Retail Network Pty [2006] VSC 223 it was said that `in my opinion an 
implied obligation of good faith would preclude the franchisor from exercising, or threatening to exercise, its 
OLWHUDOO\XQTXDOLILHGSRZHUXQGHUWKHIUDQFKLVHDJUHHPHQW«LQRUGHUWRVHFXUH>WKHIUDQFKLVHHV¶@SUHPDWXUH
GHWHUPLQDWLRQQHJDWHWKHLUH[WHQGHGWHUPDQGH[SURSULDWH>WKHLU@LQWHUHVWVDWDQXQGHUYDOXH¶  
26 [2003] 1 AC 518. 
27 411 Mass. 451 and discussed by T.Weigand, `The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial 
&RQWUDFWVLQ0DVVDFKVHWWV¶0DVV/5 
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decision that a breach of contract has arisen given the improper use of powers conferred might be 
arrived at by construction of the terms concerned: `If a contract confers power on a contracting party 
in terms wider than necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of that party, the courts may 
interpret the power as not extending to the action proposed by the party in whom the power is vested 
or, alternatively, conclude that the powers are being exercised in a capricious or arbitrary manner or for 
DQH[WUDQHRXVSXUSRVHZKLFKLVDQRWKHUZD\RIVD\LQJWKHVDPHWKLQJ·28  
As with the employment contract the task of the adjudicator is eased by a willingness to generalise once 
one has identified a category of relationship that tends to contain a wide disparity of bargaining power. 
The courts tend not to differentiate between the positions of employees (despite the infinite variety of 
circumstances that arise in working life) but view them as a homogeneous class.29 Similarly, in Meridian 
Retail  v Australian Unity Retail Network, it was said that it `was not established that the franchisees, in 
the present case, were vulnerable or substantially disadvantaged in relation to the franchisor. Relevant 
authorities indicate, however, that the implication of an obligation of good faith may be particularly 
appropriate in the context of a franchise relationship, doubtless because it frequently embodies a 
significant disparity of bargaining power.·30 
I would maintain that the incorporation of an obligation of fair dealing into a type of contract which 
can be seen as analogous to employment is to be welcomed. The difference, for instance, between a 
contract of franchise and one of employment is a matter of form rather than substance: `it appears that 
the definition of the franchisee as a separate firm, rather than as part of the franchisor, is a legal and 
QRWDQHFRQRPLFGLVWLQFWLRQ·31By entering into a franchise the franchisor achieves vertical integration 
without responsibility; as much control is likely to exist over the franchisee as would be the case in an 
employment relationship.32 In Massey v Crown Life it was acknowledged that two individuals working 
side by side for the same employer may have a different status even though they discharged precisely 
the same functions.; one may be an employee whilst the other is self-employed.33 The same is true in 
the world of franchising: `McDonald's stores in Australia fall into two classes. First there are those 
owned by McDonald's itself and conducted by it through employee managers and staff«The second 
                                                          
28 Alcatel Australia v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349. Again the same outcome might have been arrived at in 
some instances by the application of the long established implied obligation of co-operation. 
29 D.Brodie, Voice and the Employment Contract in A.Bogg and T.Novitz (eds) Voices at Work: Continuity and 
Change in the Common Law World (forthcoming: OUP 2014).   
30 Meridian Retail, above n.25.  
31 35XELQC7KH7KHRU\RIWKH)LUPDQGWKH6WUXFWXUHRIWKH)UDQFKLVH&RQWUDFW¶-/(
233.  
32 Meridian Retail, above n. 25.    
33 [1978] ICR 590. 
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class comprises those stores conducted by independent operators under licence agreements such as 
those in this case. Each owner/operator conducts their own business, although they do so under very 
strict control and supervision by McDonald's. They are required under the terms of their licence 
agreement to conform to the requirements of McDonald's in nearly every aspect of their business. 
These requirements concern food type and standards, kitchen and service areas, the manner, 
presentation and sale of food, the design, appearance and standard of the premises including adjacent 
parking areasKRXUVRIWUDGLQJVWDIILQJLQFOXGLQJWUDLQLQJDQGSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGILQDQFLDOUHSRUWLQJ·34 
 
A franchise agreement often simply gives rise to an employment relationship by another name with the 
corollary that the franchisee will be as vulnerable as an employee. Abuse of superior bargaining power 
should be addressed irrespective of the way in which the working relationship is constituted by the 
employer.  The Privy Council decision in Caltex v Feenan dealt with a solus agreement and illustrates this 
very well.35 The claimants had agreed to supply petrol bought from Caltex at a service station leased 
from them. The contract involved would have been categorised as commercial but obliged the 
claimants to provide labour (formally the obligation was not to provide their own though the practical 
reality was different). The Privy Council found that operating through this medium meant that labour 
costs may be less than where employees are hired directly. In addition, the employer gained not only 
the licence fee and rental of goodwill but procured `an assured and profitable outlet for their products 
without incurring the expense of paying wages to employees for doing what, under the solus contract, 
the Feenans had bound themselvHVWRGRLQVWHDG·It is important that the law affords protection in 
situations of this type to ensure that those providing labour are not exploited. In Caltex the terms of 
the contract made it inevitable that the claimants would themselves have to perform the work required 
to discharge the obligations set out in the solus agreement:  `The Feenans undertook to conduct the 
business on the premises during all lawful hours and to use their best endeavours to secure any 
necessary authority or permission to secXUHWKDWWKRVHODZIXOKRXUVVKRXOGEHDVORQJDVSRVVLEOH· They 
lived, in effect, the lives of employees and like many employees found themselves working excessive 
hours for limited reward.    
 
Relational Contracts   
Shenelau, by looking to analogous relationships, can be seen as expounding a more general principle 
than that found in Wallace; its application though is restricted to agreements that exhibit particular 
                                                          
34 Far Horizons, above n. 18, para 3. 
35 [1981] 1 WLR 1003. 
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features.  A broader and more inclusive approach can also be detected. Both the employment contract 
and a franchise agreement can be categorised as relational contracts. The recent decision in Yam Seng v 
ITC involved a distribution agreement and it was held that there was an implied term that the parties 
would deal with each other in good faith.36 One of the key factors in favour of this outcome was the 
fact that the agreement was seen as relational and implication was seen as furthering the values of such 
contracts: ` The parties are not aiming at utility-maximisation directly through the performance of 
specified obligations; rather, they are aiming at utility-maximisation indirectly through long term co-
RSHUDWLYHEHKDYLRXUPDQLIHVWHGLQWUXVWDQGQRWLQUHOLDQFHRQREOLJDWLRQVVSHFLILHGLQDGYDQFH·  An 
obligation of good faith is consistent with a key tenet of relational contract theory; i.e. that a contract is 
a `fundamentally co-RSHUDWLYHH[FKDQJHUHODWLRQVKLS·37 Two words of caution might be uttered. First, 
judgments which adopt the terminology of relational contracts remain relatively rare; the only decision 
of note in the employment context is Johnson.38 Even where the terminology is deployed we cannot be 
sure of the extent of shared understanding. Second, it is not immediately apparent that all commercial 
parties would share the values held by the parties in Yam Seng; reasonable people will differ over what is 
required by ` UHDVRQDEOHFRPPHUFLDOVWDQGDUGVRIIDLUGHDOLQJ·39 There is much to be said for 
%URZQVZRUG·V view that `in different times and in different places, commercial standards might 
implicate thicker or thinner views of co-RSHUDWLYHHQWLWOHPHQWVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV·40 It is perfectly 
conceivable that in a future dispute categorisation of a commercial contract as relational would be 
consistent with the court determining the matter by reference to a different set of norms. For some, 
the practical implementation of relational contract theory is predicated on translating the practice of 
the parties into legal obligations: WKH¶RXJKWV·RIUHODWLRQDOFRQWUDFWDUH¶WKHSURGXFWRIZKDWDSSHDUV
DFWXDOO\WRZRUNLQVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ·41 Ultimately, it is for the courts to exercise a value judgment as to 
which behaviours should be treated as prescriptive. If the practice of the parties does not lead to 
implication on traditional grounds (e.g. through incorporation by course of dealing) there can be no 
guarantee that depicting the contract as relational will do so. I am far from convinced that it is 
axiomatic that categorisation as relational allows one to conclude that an obligation of fair dealing 
                                                          
36 [2013] EWHC 111. For further discussion see Campbell, above n.1 and S.Whittaker, `Good faith, implied 
WHUPVDQGFRPPHUFLDOFRQWUDFWV¶/45 
37 Campbell, above n.1.  
38 Johnson, above n.26.  
39 CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Co [2010] EWHC 1535. 
40 R. Brownsword in Contract and Economic Organisation (D. Campbell and P.Vincent-Jones (eds)) 27. In Esso 
Australia Resources v Southern Pacific Petroleum [2005] VSCA 228, para 3 it was said that `If a duty of good 
faith exists, it really means that there is a standard of contractual conduct that should be met. The difficulty is 
that the standard is nebulous. Therefore, the current reticence attending the application and recognition of a duty 
of good faith probably lies as much with the vagueness and imprecision inherent in defining commercial 
morality.¶   
 
41 I. R. Macneil, The New Social Contract (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) 408. 
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arises.  
 
Fair Dealing  
 
A third factor which explains the movement towards greater convergence in the values of contracting 
parties is the growing acceptance that a norm of fair dealing is part and parcel of commercial 
contracting in general. This can be seen at international level where good faith type obligations are 
increasingly to be found in key codes and conventions. Waddams highlights the fact that good faith is 
regarded by the Draft Common Frame of Reference CDVSDUWRIWKHXQGHUO\LQJSULQFLSOHRIMXVWLFH·42 
Again, Freedland and Kountouris point to WKHCTXLWH«YLJRURXVGHYHORSPHQWRIQRWLRQVRIJRRGIDLWK
DQGIDLUGHDOLQJLQ(XURSHDQV\VWHPVRISULYDWHODZ· 43 At the level of specific jurisdictions a 
comparative excursus also confirms that such instruments are not confined to civilian systems; a 
number of common law systems embody a norm of good faith in their commercial law. The US is a 
notable example given that both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts are of this ilk. It is difficult to gauge how influential the international and comparative 
position has been but the strong degree of consensus conveys a very cogent message. Against that 
backdrop, we find that fair dealing has come much more to the fore in commercial law in the UK. 
Since Reda was decided the law of commercial contracts has become increasingly willing to incorporate 
obligations of this nature dealing. Cases such as the decision of the Court of Appeal in Socimer 
International Bank v Standard Bank, which dealt with a commercial contract between two banks, hold that 
discretionary provisions are now regulated in a manner similar to the way that they would be if they 
arose in the employment contract: ` Where A and B contract with one another to confer a discretion 
on A, that does not render B subject to A's uninhibited whim. In my judgment, the authorities show 
that not only must the discretion be exercised honestly and in good faith, but, having regard to the 
provisions of the contract by which it must be conferred, it must not be exercised arbitrarily, 
capriciousO\RUXQUHDVRQDEO\·44 Indeed in the Court of Appeal in Mid Essex v Compass Group Jackson 
LJ went so far as to suggest that such `a term is extremely difficult to exclude, although I would not say 
LWLVXWWHUO\LPSRVVLEOHWRGRVR·45 This overstates the current position but does testify to the growing 
acceptance that disputes should be determined by reference to fair dealing. Something in the way of a 
process of cross-fertilisation may be underway. In upholding the contention that an implied term of 
                                                          
42 S. Waddams, Principle and Policy in Contract Law (2011)  213. 
43 Freedland and Kountouris, above n.7, 197. 
44 [2008] EWCA Civ 116. 
45 [2013] EWCA Civ 200, para 83.  
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good faith existed in Yam Seng developments in a number of areas, including the law of the 
employment contract, were looked to. The fact that a modification of general contractual principles has 
functioned successfully in a specific type of contract makes it more likely that in turn it will provide the 
catalyst for the transformation of other nominate contracts or indeed the general principles 
themselves.46 The conceptualisation of sham contracts that took place in Autoclenz v Belcher 47can be 
seen in this light as it was facilitated by prior developments in the law of landlord and tenant. 48 
   
In addition, the courts may see themselves as reflecting changes in the practices and values of the 
parties and not simply imposing judicial conceptions of appropriate behaviour. In Yam Seng, the 
question of implication, as with questions of construction, was determined on a contextual basis. 
Crucially, the values of the commercial parties helped inform that context:  `the relevant background 
against which contracts are made includes not only matters of fact known to the parties but also shared 
values and norms of behaviour. Some of these are norms that command general social acceptance; 
others may be specific WRDSDUWLFXODUWUDGHRUFRPPHUFLDODFWLYLW\«·7KHGHFLVLRQLQIDYRXURI
implication of an obligation of good faith was seen as according with the values of the world of 
commerce (though it is not clear how those values were ascertained). Somewhat contradictorily, the 
term was viewed as an implied term in fact as the law of commercial contracts was not seen at a stage 
of development whereby it could apply as a matter of generality and therefore be classified as an 
implied term in law. 49 It is certainly highly debateable whether commercial contracts can be viewed as a 
homogeneous class.50 
 
It might of course be said that such decisions are no more than further instances of the conventional 
English approach of fashioning `piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of 
unfairness·51 or, adopting a more positive outlook, `instances of specific duties which do the useful part 
                                                          
46 In Park Cakes v Shumba [2013] EWCA Civ 974 Lord Underhill drew attention to the absence of an 
CDUWLFXODWHGFRQFHSWXDOXQGHUSLQQLQJ¶LQWKHVLQJOHHPSOR\HUFXVWRPFDVHRIAlbion Automotive v Walker [2002] 
EWCA Civ 946. The law of unilateral contracts may provide the answer: D.Brodie,  `Reflecting the dynamics of 
HPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQV¶,/- 
47 [2011] ICR 1157. And see A.Bogg , `Sham Self-(PSOR\PHQWLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶,-/ 
48 AG Securities v Vaughan [1990] 1 A.C. 417 
49 This would appear to be correct: Mid Essex above n. 44.  Again, in Hamsard 3147 v Boots UK [2013] EWHC 
325, Norris J  declined to find that Yam Seng was `authority for the proposition that in commercial contracts it 
may be taken to be the presumed intention of the parties that there is a ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ?ŐŽŽĚĨĂŝƚŚ ? ? ? 
50 5+RROH\C&RQWUROOLQJ&RQWUDFWXDO'LVFUHWLRQ¶&/- 
51 Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes  [1989] 1 QB 433, 439. 
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RIWKHZRUNRIJRRGIDLWK·52  However, the steadily increasing weight of case law may lead to the 
emergence of an overarching principle of good faith. Certainly, when we take into account the way in 
which the law of contract in similar common law systems has developed it does not seem fanciful to 
suggest that such a norm is likely to become part of the law of commercial contracts sooner rather than 
later. Australian experience indicates that once disputes begin to be adjudicated by reference to a norm 
of fair dealing it is not long before that norm becomes embedded. There has been a radical shift of 
position in Australia over the last 20 years and ` fundamental notions of caveat emptor·now seem 
utterly anachronistic. The decision in Rennard Constructions (ME) Pty Limited v Minister for Public Works 
has proved to be highly influential; there it was said that ` people generally, including judges and other 
lawyers, from all strands of the community, have grown used to the courts applying standards of 
fairness to contract which are wholly consistent with the existence in all contracts of a duty upon the 
parties of good faith and fair dealing in its performance. In my view this is in these days the expected 
VWDQGDUGDQGDQ\WKLQJOHVVLVFRQWUDU\WRSUHYDLOLQJFRPPXQLW\H[SHFWDWLRQV·53 Since then there have 
been numerous decisions of the Australian courts that have regulated the dealings of commercial 
parties by reference to implicit obligations of fair dealing.54 It would be erroneous to describe the law as 
settled (a decision of the High Court would be beneficial) but it does seem highly unlikely that the 
world of traditional contracting will be restored. The case law exhibits a degree of uncertainty over 
whether implication is contingent upon the presence of inequality of bargaining power.  The most that 
can be said is that the existence of disparity makes it more likely that an obligation of fair dealing will 
be held to exist. There has also been a measure of controversy with respect to whether the obligation 
of fair dealing should be seen as in implied term in fact or law. This reflects the fact that commercial 
relationships are now seen as much more diffuse and it does not make sense to treat them as a singular 
class.  
 
Fairer Contracting?  
 
In Australia and Canada good faith has much to say about the way in which a contract for work should 
be conducted. Analysis of case law in the UK indicates a trend towards fair dealing playing a greater 
part in such disputes but, beyond the employment contract, the law is still in a decidedly embryonic 
stage. Up until now, for instance, a franchise contract appears to have been viewed as a commercial 
                                                          
52 D.Campbell, above n.1.   
53 (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. 
54 See, for instance, Paterson, above n. 22.  
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agreement. In cases involving the enforceability of restrictive covenants the contract has been treated 
as analogous to the goodwill cases rather than ones dealing with the employment contract. 55 Similarly, 
attempts to suggest that a franchise agreement is subject to the obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence have foundered because the relationship was seen as commercial in nature. 56  
 
I would suggest that this is likely to change sooner rather than later where the relationship can be 
viewed as analogous to employment. The incremental approach to the extension of Wallace which took 
place in Shelanu is an attractive and convincing one. The problems faced by the weaker party are of a 
broadly similar nature and it is equitable that parity of protection is afforded. The characteristics which 
are shared generate common problems; common solutions will often be apposite. Such a development 
of the law would not be dependent on the recognition of an overarching principle of good faith. As 
with the emergence of mutual trust and confidence the approach in Shelanu is firmly grounded in the 
YDOXHVRIWKHFRPPRQODZZKLFK´«ZLOOQRWSHUPLWDEXVHRISRZHU7KLVLVWKHEDVLVRIMXGLFLDO
review, and it reflects also the basis of all those private law doctrines where public policy has been held 
WRUHVWUDLQRQHPDQ
VKROGRYHUDQRWKHUµ57. 
6RPHUHODWLRQVKLSVPLJKWEHWKRXJKWWREHFORVHO\DQDORJRXVWRHPSOR\PHQW)UHHGODQG·VFRQFHSWRI
the semi-dependent worker comes to the fore at this juncture.58 Mutual trust and confidence might 
readily attach to such a relationship given it `may actually be a personal one and a high-trust one to the 
same extent as the fully dependent work relationship. Indeed, some semi-GHSHQGHQWZRUNHUV·FRQWUDFWV
may embody more personal and even, in a sense, higher trust relationships that some contracts of 
HPSOR\PHQW·59  More generally, deciding whether a relationship is analogous to employment may not 
be altogether straightforward. I would submit that the position adopted in Shelanu is compelling where 
a franchise is concerned. What though of a contract for services? As already discussed, if one 
                                                          
55 Kall-Kwik Printing v Rush [1996] FSR 114. 
56 Jani-King (GB) v Pula Enterprises [2007] EWHC 2433. 
57 Sir John Laws, `Public Law and Employment Law: Abuse of Power [1997] PL 455, 464. 
58 Freedland, above n.1, 28. Such a worker would be employed under a contract for work `to be carried out 
ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇŝŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂŶĚŶŽƚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?
59 Ibid at 169-170. 
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approaches the issue through a comparison of the terms of the contracts it would be easy to conclude 
that an analogous relationship has been shown to exist. However, the position of an individual entering 
into a contract for services might be thought to be very different from situations where the services are 
provided by a corporate body. In the former case one could readily assume (as with employment and 
franchise) that inequality of bargaining power and all its attendant problems existed. In such cases the 
incorporation of a term of fair dealing seems highly justifiable. Quite clearly one could not make the 
same assumptions where a corporate body was concerned.  
Recent developments in tort law also raise questions about the position of the contract for services. 
There the courts are now prepared to extend the categories of relationship for which a defendant is 
vicariously liable to include those ` akin to that between an employer and an employee·JGE v English 
Province of our Lady of Charity concerned the responsibility of the bishop of the diocese for a parish priest 
whose appointment did not give rise to a contractual relationship; the priest holding nothing other than 
ecclesiastical office.60 The Court of Appeal had to determine, by way of a preliminary question, whether 
vicarious liability could still arise. The conventional response would have been no. However, a majority 
of the court held that the relationship was so close in character to one of employment that it was just 
and fair to hold the defendant vicariously liable. This might be thought to be a somewhat surprising 
outcome as the `relationship was significantly different from that between an employer and an 
HPSOR\HH·61 So far as future cases are concerned, Ward LJ (who gave the leading judgment)tells us that 
one should seek to identify `WKHEURDGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHHPSOR\HUHPSOR\HHUHODWLRQVKLS·DQGDVN
ZKHWKHUWKHFRQWUDFWLQLVVXHCEHDUVDVXIILFLHQWO\FORVHUHVHPEODQFHDQGDIILQLW\LQFKDUDFWHU·WRRQHRI
employment. This approach was approved by the Supreme Court in Various Claimants v Catholic Child 
Welfare Society but will without doubt prove troublesome.62 The vagaries of the test will, without 
doubt, encourage counsel to challenge current orthodoxies. It has already been argued that vicarious 
                                                          
60 [2012] PIQR P19.  
61 Lord Hope, `Tailoring the law on vicarioXVOLDELOLW\¶/45 
62 [2013] 3 WLR 1319.  
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liability can now arise with respect to a prisoner.63 It is striking that JGE confirms that the employer is 
not liable for the activities of independent contractors; thereby denying the existence of perhaps the 
clearest analogy. This conclusion was reached even though the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the 
endeavours of the self-employed may be just as central to the success of the enterprise as those of 
employees: `the employer may have as close a connection with his regularly used independent 
contractor as he has with an employee wKRLVEXWDQDQRQ\PRXVPHPEHURIKLVZRUNIRUFH· 
 
I would suggest though that the position adopted by the law of vicarious liability will not diminish the 
force of arguments by analogy where the law of the contract is concerned. Vicarious liability is an area 
where policy considerations dominate and JGE may simply reflect the long established orthodoxy that, 
for a variety of reasons, the employer is not vicariously liable for an independent contractor. The policy 
issues which are relevant to the formation of default rules for contracts for work are of a different 
order. It is also the case that the increasing emphasis on enterprise liability may lead to a reassessment 
of the traditional position in tort.  The latter doctrine has led to an expansion of the types of behaviour 
that lead to liability; it is equally relevant to the identification of relationships that render the employer 
responsible. I would suggest that maintaining that relationships of self-employment are not caught by 
an `akin to HPSOR\PHQW·WHVWLVunstable and likely to be sustainable.64  
 
                                                          
63 In Cox v Ministry of Justice [2013] EW Misc 1, while working as a catering manager at HM Prison Swansea, 
the claimant suffered injury in an accident caused by the negligence of a prisoner who was carrying out paid 
work under her supervision. She argued, in reliance upon Various Claimants that the defendant was vicariously 
liable for the negligence of the prisoner. The claim failed as the relationship was viewed as being explicable on 
the basis of penal policy. 
64 The extension of the law of non-delegable duties in Woodland v Essex CC [2013] UKSC 66 to render the 
defendant strictly liable for the behaviour of an independent contractor may be noted. It may be argued that, 
rather than adding a further exception, it would have made more sense for the law on vicarious liability to 
reassess whether the employer should be liable for contractors. Baroness Hale observing in Woodland that some 
of the traditional arguments against the imposition of liability may no longer hold good `in today's world where 
large organisations may well outsource their responsibilities to much poorer and un- or under-insured 
FRQWUDFWRUV¶Cleightonhills v Bembridge Marine [2012] EWHC 3449 found, obiter, that the employer should be 
treated as vicariously for someone who had been self-employed.   
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The Contract for Services Revisited   
 
Against this backdrop, where the law of contract is concerned, I would suggest that an individual 
entering into a contract for services is likely to be held to be in a position analogous to the employee. 
Contracts where the services are provided by a corporate body lie at the other end of the spectrum and 
such a relationship would only fully take on board a norm of good faith when contract law as a whole 
adopts an overarching principle.  There is a myriad of intermediate positions which render 
generalisation problematic. Where individuals are concerned I would anticipate that a default rule of 
fair dealing will emerge shortly. It is already the case that the content of contracts for the provision of 
work display a great deal of commonality and further convergence would be a perfectly natural 
development. As I have discussed, it had previously been thought that matters might be somewhat 
different where the personal elements of the contract for services were concerned and, in particular, 
that the implied term of mutual trust and confidence had no application. This outcome can be justified 
on the basis that the implication of the term assumes the existence of a contract involving personal 
relations.  However, I would argue that the existence of disparity in bargaining power and the 
consequent risk of abuse of power are sufficient in themselves to justify a norm of fair dealing being 
required. The element of personal relations in the employment relationship should be seen as an 
additional reason for the importation of an obligation of mutual trust. Of course a number of mutual 
trust cases address appropriate standards of behaviour in the workplace and render conduct such as 
bullying and harassment a breach of contract. The focus is on the way in which personal relations are 
carried out on a day to day basis rather than the economic elements of the bargain. Where self-
employment is concerned cases of this type might also arise and there is no reason why they should not 
be dealt with in the same way. Someone running a small business may well be treated in a degrading or 
humiliating way by the larger concern with which he trades; either by a particular individual with whom 
a relationship has built up or more opaquely. In any event, personals relationships emerge in a variety 
of relational contracts; not just the employment contract. Macneil asserts WKDWWKH¶ZKROHSHUVRQ·LV
OLDEOHWREHPRUHLPSRUWDQWLQDQRQJRLQJUHODWLRQVKLSSDUWLHV¶GHULYHFRPSOH[SHUVRQDOQRQ-economic 
VDWLVIDFWLRQVDQGHQJDJHLQVRFLDOH[FKDQJHDVZHOODV«HFRQRPLFH[FKDQJH·65 It may be said though 
that the element of personal relations is a universal characteristic of contracts for the personal 
provision of work; a claim which cannot be maintained in other contexts. This may well be true but we 
should not disregard this dimension when it does arise elsewhere.  
                                                          
65Macneil, above n.40, 72. 
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Common law developments in the law of tort are also relevant in considering how the contract for 
services is likely to develop. I would suggest that they also point towards convergence.66 Currently, the 
employer owes the self-employed worker less extensive obligations in terms of health and safety than 
DUHRZHGWRWKHHPSOR\HH7KHUHDVRQZK\DPRUHUHVWULFWHGGXW\LVRZHGPD\EHWKDW¶WKHULVNRI
accident is incidental to the contractor's enterprise rDWKHUWKDQKLVHPSOR\HU
V·+RZHYHUVXFKDQ
allocation of risk is based upon a set of assumptions which come under challenge from current judicial 
notions of enterprise liability.67 Enterprise liability seeks to attribute legal responsibility to the enterprise 
for activities which it has undertaken that carry risks.  The pursuit of any particular activity may require 
WKHVHUYLFHVQRWMXVWRIDQHQWLW\·VRZQHPSOR\HHVEXWDOVRWKRVHZKRFRQWUDFWRQDGLIIHUHQWEDVLV,WLV
submitted that it follows from this that the duty of care owed to, for example, a FRQWUDFWRU·VHPSOR\HHV
VKRXOGEHLQOLQHZLWKWKDWRZHGWRWKHHQWHUSULVH·VDFWXDOHPSOR\HHV%RWKJURXSVRIVWDIIHQFRXQWHU
risks created by the enterprise whilst furthering its aims. It would seem equitable that parity of 
treatment in terms of safety obligations exist.68    
Differences between the contract for employment and that for services will of course remain. The 
employee owes an obligation of fidelity but the contractor does not. However, an obligation of 
confidentiality might well be implied where the matter is not otherwise dealt with.  Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that the overall trend is very much in favour of convergence. Scally brought about more 
demanding disclosure requirements within the employment relationship and there are some indications 
that commercial law is starting to follow suit. It appears that where a relational contract is concerned 
the courts have begun to impose requirements to disclose. In the Australian case of Macquarie 
International it was said that a party may be obliged ` to disclose information to the other, listen to the 
other and negotiate in good faith about the working out of the contract in its living performance.·69 
Similarly, in Yam Seng it was said to be arguable that the distributor was entitled to be informed of the 
PDQXIDFWXUHU·Vbest estimates of when the products would be available to sell and to be told of any 
                                                          
66 And see Freedland, above n.2, 151-4. 
67 See D.Brodie, Enterprise Liability and the Common Law, (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) Ch 11.   
68 The Australian decision in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling (1986) 160 CLR 16 can be seen as very much in 
line with the concept of enterprise liability.     
69 Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Limited v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWCA 
268.  
19 
 
material change in this information. The values said to underpinn relational contracts were crucial in 
both of these decisions as contracts of this type ` may require a high degree of communication, 
cooperation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence and involve 
expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in the express terms of the contract but are implicit 
in the parties' understanding and necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements.·70 I would add 
that disparity in bargaining power is also an important consideration as asymmetry of information 
about the risks of the venture and so on is more likely to arise where the resources available to the 
parties are decidedly unequal.    
 
The Contract of Employment Revisited  
If obligations of good faith are becoming increasingly prevalent in the law of contract as a whole what are the 
implications for the employment contract? I believe that the `employment revolution· which we have witnessed 
over the past thirty years will gather renewed impetus and it is likely that the contract will develop further 
dimensions of the good faith type. The position on contracting-out may be progressed. On traditional 
principles, it would be possible to contract-out of the implied obligation of trust and confidence as the 
term is a default rule. 71The courts have been inclined to discourage any attempts at exclusion.72  It is 
sometimes assumed that we can be confident that derogation would be forbidden by the judiciary on 
grounds of public policy given that mutual trust and confidence is absolutely fundamental to the 
employment relationship. A recent instance of such optimism can be found in the joint advice of the 
Law Commissions on Unfair Contract Terms.73 The Commissions noted the argument that the decline 
of collective bargaining left more scope for substantively unfair terms in employment contracts. They 
also highlighted the concern over the potential use of express terms to contract out of the terms which 
                                                          
70 Yam Seng, above n. 36, para 142. 
71 See Lord Steyn in Johnson above n. 26. 
72 Lord BinghamC)RUP6HUYDQWWR(PSOR\HH$6WXG\RIWKH&RPPRQ/DZLQ$FWLRQ¶6$F/- 
73 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, `Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to the 
'HSDUWPHQWIRU%XVLQHVV,QQRYDWLRQDQG6NLOOV¶0DUFK 
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the law would otherwise imply into employment contracts, such as the obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence. It was said that this was not a matter of genuine concern and the views of one consultee in 
particular were influential: `I also think it is unlikely that a Court or Tribunal in the United Kingdom 
would uphold an apparently valid attempt to exclude the implied obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence. I can certainly see as a matter of first principles that any implied term could be supplanted 
by an express term, it is just that a Court or Tribunal would be expected to disregard such an attempt 
on public policy grounds there being so much authority to the effect that the implied obligation of 
mutual trust and confidence is an irreducible term in the employment contract because such contracts 
JRYHUQUHODWLRQVKLSVHVVHQWLDOO\RIDSHUVRQDOQDWXUH· Such views also gain credence from the much 
more common position in other European systems whereby `the regulation of the content and the 
SHUIRUPDQFHRIFRQWUDFWVRIHPSOR\PHQW«PRUHUHDGLO\SUHVHQWVLWVHOIDVjus cogens in character, its 
norms typically appearing to be inderogable, or derogable only in very limited FLUFXPVWDQFHV·74   
It is certainly the case that it would be open to the courts to render the term `irreducible·RQJURXQGV
of public policy. The emerging law on sham contracts may offer an alternative route to mandatory 
incorporation. In the Australian case of Russell v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church LWZDVVDLGWKDWC«LI
one sought to exclude, expressly, the relationship of trust and confidence, if it were a necessary and 
essential ingredient of employment, one may still have a contract, but it is unlikely to be a contract of 
HPSOR\PHQW«8QOLNHPRVWRWKHULPSOLHGGXWLHVLWFDQQRWEHH[FOXGHGXQOHVVRQHGRHVQRWZDQWWR
KDYHDFRQWUDFWRIHPSOR\PHQW·75 I would submit that the reasoning in Russell is instructive. A clause 
which purports to exclude mutual trust in a contract which would otherwise be classified as one of 
employment should be set aside as it is incompatible with the nature of the contract: ` the written 
FRQWUDFWGRHVQRWUHSUHVHQWWKHDFWXDOWHUPVDJUHHG·76  Mutual trust and confidence is an obligation 
which is fundamental to the employment relationship and expresses the essence of the bargain. 
                                                          
74 Freedland and Kountouris, above n. 7, 182. 
75 (2008) 72 NSWLR  559 at paras 127-128 . And see B.Creighton and A.Stewart, Labour Law  (5th ed) 14.48.  
76 Autoclenz, above n. 46.  
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&UXFLDOO\LWDLPVWRSURWHFWWKHHPSOR\HH·VLQWHUHVWLQQRWEHLQJCXQIDLUO\DQGLPSURSHUO\H[SORLWHG·77 
In my view, an attempt to set up an employment relationship without the term is a sham. The 
purported transformation of the relationship is just as radical and unacceptable as the attempt to 
convert employment to self-employment in Autoclenz or a lease into a licence in AG Securities.  
 
The employer may seek to contract-out of particular applications of the term rather than attempt 
general exclusion. This will not avail him. In the recent Australian case of Barker the contract dealt 
expressly with a dimension of employment relations (redeployment) and declared that the matter was 
non-contractual.78 The Federal Court accepted that, as a result, the employer was not bound on the 
basis of the published policy. Nevertheless, the employer was still found to be in breach of the implied 
term. The view was taken that any measures which the implied term would otherwise have required if 
the contract had been silent on the issue in question could not be denied in this way.   
 
The fact that notions of good faith have become much more pervasive in contract law as a whole make 
it more likely that mutual trust and confidence will be rendered mandatory on grounds of public policy. 
Good faith type obligations have become much harder to depict as exceptions to general principles or 
as features of particular types of contract. There is no longer a need for special pleading and there is 
growing acceptance that there is no other legitimate way to conduct business affairs.  
 
Conclusions  
The courts (in the UK and abroad) are increasingly willing to attribute to contracting parties an 
acceptance that commercial relations should be informed by fair dealing. Whether an overarching 
principle will emerge in the near future remains a matter of conjecture but the likelihood has increased 
markedly. Should that eventuality materialise the law on all forms of contracts for the provision of 
                                                          
77 Malik, above n. 9, 46. 
78 Barker, above n. 1.  
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work will be affected by the consequent transformation in values underpinning commercial contracts. 
For now it can be said with confidence that the laws of commercial and employment contracts are 
moving closer together. Moreover, there is good reason to think that, where relationships analogous to 
employment are concerned, good faith will undoubtedly play a significantly greater role. Numerous 
cases have arisen in other jurisdictions in the context of franchise relationships; partly because they 
frequently embody a significant disparity of bargaining power and call out for judicial activism. As with 
employment, terms are offered on a take it or leave it basis: `the same agreement is intended to be used 
WKURXJKRXWWKHQHWZRUNZLWKRXWYDULDWLRQ·79 Inequality of bargaining power means that the weaker 
party is at risk of oppressive treatment in the way that, for example, discretionary provisions are 
exercised.  The emergence of mutual trust and confidence was, at least in part, inspired by concerns 
which were seen as unique to the employment contract. Such assumptions are very much open to 
debate and it would often be appropriate to extend the common law protection afforded to employees 
to those who provide work under other types of contract.  
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